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WHAT DRIVES BUSINESS MODEL ADAPTATION?  
THE IMPACT OF OPPORTUNITIES, THREATS AND STRATEGIC ORIENTATION  
 
Abstract 
 
Business models change as managers not only innovate business models, but also engage in more 
mundane adaptation in response to external changes, such as changes in the level or composition 
of demand. However, little is known about what causes such business model adaptation. We 
employ threat-rigidity as well as prospect theory to examine business model adaptation in response 
to external threats and opportunities. Additionally, drawing on the behavioural theory of the firm, 
we argue that the past strategic orientation of a firm creates path dependencies that influence the 
propensity of the firm to adapt its business model. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 1,196 
Norwegian companies, and find that firms are more likely to adapt their business model under 
conditions of perceived threats than opportunities, and that strategic orientation geared towards 
market development is more conducive to business model adaptation than an orientation geared 
toward defending an existing market position.  
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Introduction 
The business model has become a novel unit of analysis in management research (Zott, Amit & 
Massa, 2011). Although there is no generally agreed upon definition, many contributions to the literature 
define it in terms of the firm’s value proposition and market segments, the structure of the value chain 
required for realizing the value proposition, the mechanisms of value capture that the firm deploys, and 
how these elements are linked together in an architecture (cf. Linder & Cantrell, 2000; Magretta, 2002; 
Morris, Schindehutte &Allen, 2005; Teece, 2010; Foss & Saebi, 2015: Wirtz, Pistoia, Ullrich & Gottel, 
2015). We adopt this definition in the following. Additionally, Teece links the business model to top 
management cognition by suggesting that a business model reflects “management’s hypothesis about 
what customers want, how they want it, and how the enterprise can organize to best meet those needs, 
get paid for doing so, and make a profit” (Teece 2010, p. 172).  Teece’s notion of a hypothesis is an apt 
metaphor, because it draws attention to the dynamics of business models: As scientific hypotheses 
confront data, business models are subjected to the market test. Just as scientific hypotheses may need to 
be changed or even rejected after confronting data, business models need to be modified in face of 
external discontinuities and disruptions.  
However, in spite of recent strides forward in the understanding of the drivers, processes, and 
facilitators of business model change (notably Achtenhagen, Melin, & Naldi, 2013; Andries, Debackere, 
& Looy, 2013; Bohnsack, Pinkse, & Kolk, 2013; McNamara, Peck, & Sasson, 2013; Mason & Leek, 
2008; Andries & Debackere, 2006, 2007; Willemstein, Valk, & Meeus, 2007), there is still little 
knowledge of how firms adapt their business models in response to external threats and opportunities. 
This is problematic because a contingency perspective would suggest that the fit between the firm’s 
business model and its environment may influence profitability (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 
1973, 1977), and that timely response may be important.  
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The failure to adapt business models on time can occur for two main reasons. First, managerial 
cognition, in particular the interpretation of changes in the environment, can play a critical role in 
shaping organizational responses (Barr, 1998; Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992; Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 
1995; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Still, research is divided on whether the negative (i.e., a perceived 
threat) or positive (i.e., a perceived opportunity) framing of events is more likely to motivate 
organizational response. Proponents of threat-rigidity theory contend that perceptions of threat 
encourage managers to rely on existing routines, while perceptions of opportunity induce more risk-
taking behaviour (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). Interestingly, prospect 
theory makes exactly the opposite predictions: Under perceptions of threat, managers are more 
motivated to take risky action than under favourable conditions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Barberis, 
2013).  Additionally, research also indicates that a firm’s strategic orientation as it emerges from past 
experience, solutions and heuristics can result in path dependencies that influence organizational change 
and adaptability (Day, 1994; Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; Lant & Mezias, 1992).  In contrast, firms and 
managers that are oriented towards continually finding and exploiting new market opportunities might 
be more perceptive and better equipped to adapt their business model in face of emerging threats and 
opportunities than might firms with a more defensive posture (Teece, 2007).  
We offer the following contributions in this study. First, reviewing extant literature on business 
model dynamics, we identify important drivers, processes, and facilitators of business model adaptation. 
Second, we examine to what extent established theories of organizational and strategic adaptation 
described by the threat-rigidity hypothesis (Staw et al., 1981) and prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) are able to predict business model adaptation. This is an 
important exercise, as we currently lack a strong theoretical foundation for understanding business 
model dynamics. Third, we test our hypotheses by examining the effects of the recent financial recession 
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on the propensity of firms to adapt their business models in the face of perceived threats and 
opportunities. We use the financial crisis as a natural experiment, which warrants a causal interpretation 
of our results, albeit a very cautious one. As Kitching, Blackburn, Smallbone and Dixon (2009, p.12) 
point out, “there is no single ‘recession effect’ for businesses, nor consequently any particular ‘best way’ 
to adapt applicable to all businesses”. Hence, business model adaptation may not be a viable option for 
all firms. In this regard, we offer empirical evidence on the contingent role that a firm’s strategic 
orientation plays in influencing whether or not a firm is likely to adapt its business model. Fourth, this 
study is one of the very few large-N empirical studies of business model dynamics. Specifically, we test 
our hypotheses on a sample of 1,196 Norwegian companies surveyed in 2010. 
Theoretical Background 
Business models and business model adaptation 
Business models have become an influential new unit of analysis in management research. 
However, the literature has, like many other emerging fields, been characterized by conceptual 
proliferation. Thus, Shafer, Smith and Linder (2005) surveyed up to twelve different definitions of 
business models in established publications during 1998–2002, which together produced a list of forty-
two different business model components. Recent reviews indicate that as interest has kept growing, the 
discrepancies in the use of constructs, definitions and operationalizations continue to plague the field 
(cf., Zott, Amit & Massa, 2011; George & Bock, 2011; Foss & Saebi, 2015). However, it is also the case 
that many contributions converge on a definition that stresses the following elements as necessary parts 
of the definition of a business model: (1) the firm’s value proposition, (2) the market segments it 
addresses, (3) the structure of the value chain, which is required for realizing the value proposition, (4) 
the mechanisms of value capture that the firm deploys, and (5) the often firm-specific ways in which 
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these elements are linked in an architecture (cf. Linder & Cantrell, 2000; Magretta, 2002; Morris et al., 
2005; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010; DaSilva & Trkman, 2013; Wirtz et al., 2015).  
Increasingly, the literature has been moving from conceptualizing, characterizing and explaining 
a business model at a given point in time, towards a more dynamic view that examines phenomena like 
business model innovation and adaptation. Table 1 lists a number of concepts that are often used to refer 
to a change in an existing business model.  
-------- Insert table 1 here-------- 
Based on the research summarized in Table 1, two main types of business model dynamics can 
be identified. One group of studies seems to refer to the changes occurring in existing business models 
over time, often in response to an external trigger. This includes work on business model “evolution”, 
“learning,” “erosion” and “lifecycles” (cf., Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Teece, 2010; McGrath, 2010; Morris 
et al., 2005). We define these changes as business model adaptation, that is, the process by which 
management actively aligns the firm’s business model to a changing environment, for example, changes 
in the preferences of customers, supplier bargaining power, technological changes, competition, etc. In 
contrast, another group of studies refers to the need to create (typically, disruptive) innovation by means 
of implementing an innovative business model (cf. Markides, 2006; Aspara, Hietanen & Tikkanen, 
2010; Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013). Often, business model innovation is defined as the process by 
which management actively innovates the business model to disrupt market conditions.   
Business model adaptation and innovation differ in the following important ways. First, while the 
kind of novelty implied by the notion of an “innovation” might be a likely outcome of business model 
adaptation, it is not a necessary requirement. Business model adaptation can be non-innovative. Second, 
while business model adaptation is a response to external causes, business model innovation may be 
driven by internal as well as external factors (Bucherer, Eisert & Gassman, 2012). This further 
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highlights the difference in motivation between business model adaptation and innovation. In adapting 
the business model to changing external conditions, the firm aims to attain alignment with the 
environment (on strategic adaptation, cf. Frishammar, 2006; on organizational adaptation, see Hrebiniak 
& Joyce, 1985; Chakravarthy, 1982). In contrast, an important motivation for business model innovation 
is to shape markets or industries by means of creating disruptive innovations (cf. Markides, 2006; Saebi, 
2015).  
Drivers of business model adaptation 
What is known about business model adaptation? Table 2 depicts four (partly overlapping) research 
streams within this emerging literature, namely, research on the drivers, performance implications, 
process and facilitators of business model adaptation. As our study is concerned with the drivers of 
business model adaptation, we excluded those studies that are solely focused on business model 
innovation.  
-------- Insert Table 2 here-------- 
Important drivers of business model adaptation include the need to adapt to external stakeholders 
(Ferreira, Proença, Spencer & Cova, 2013; Miller, McAdam & McAdam, 2014), changes in the 
competitive environment (Voelpel, Leibold &Tekie, 2004; De Reuver, Bouwman & MacInnes, 2009) 
and opportunities brought about by new information and communication technologies (ICT) (Pateli & 
Giaglis, 2005; Sabatier, Craig-Kennard & Mangematin, 2012; Wirtz, Schilke & Ullrich, 2010). In the 
literature that we reviewed, business model adaptation is likely to occur under conditions of threat as 
well as opportunity. However, no study has examined the relative importance of threat versus 
opportunity on the propensity of the firm to adapt its business model.   
 Instead, the majority of studies that we reviewed highlight the difficulties in managing the 
adaptation process. The willingness to experiment (McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010; Cavalcante, 2014; 
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Andries et al., 2013) and the ability to develop leadership and organizational capabilities (Achtenhagen 
et al., 2013; Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Dunford, Palmer & Benveniste, 2010; Doz & Kosonen, 2010) are 
found to be decisive in business model adaptation. Furthermore, an emerging stream of literature points 
towards path dependencies as a major hurdle in business model adaptation (e.g., Doz & Kosonen, 2010; 
Cavalcante, Kesting & Ulhoi, 2011; Bohnsack et al., 2013). Business models are manifested in a set of 
structured and interdependent operational activities and relationships within and between the firm and its 
external stakeholders (Doz & Kosonen, 2010). While these structures and processes contribute to 
stability and increased operational efficiency, they can lead to growing rigidity. In other words, business 
models can become increasingly inert over time (Cavalcante et al., 2011; Santos, Spector & van der 
Heyden, 2015).  
Therefore, adapting an existing business model is often not an easy task. Adaptation may imply 
changes of the firm’s value proposition, market segment, value chain and value-capture, or how these 
are linked in an architecture. Either way, adapting a business model is likely to involve some level of 
uncertainty with respect to the success of the outcome (Andries & Debackere, 2007; McNamara et al., 
2013). Given organizational inertia and outcome uncertainty, firms are unlikely to change their business 
model unless they have rather strong incentives to do so. Even in cases where the need for adaptation 
seems evident, the firm’s strategic orientation and the associated path dependencies are likely to impede 
the process of adapting an existing business model to new market demands or competitive threats 
(Cavalcante et al., 2011; Bohnsack et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2015). In the following, we discuss the 
effects of external threats versus opportunities on the propensity of firms to adapt their business model, 
and the role of strategic orientation in facilitating or hindering this process.   
Hypotheses 
Prospect theory versus threat-rigidity theory: predictions of risk behaviour  
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The adaptation of firms to their external environments has been investigated for several decades in 
various streams in the strategic and organizational literatures (e.g., Perrow, 1967; Hannan & Freeman, 
1977; Chakravarthy, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997). Among these streams, the behavioural theory of the firm places particular emphasis on the role of 
performance feedback for managerial and organizational decision-making, notably in connection with 
risk-taking (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987; Greve, 2003). How individuals and organizations perceive and 
respond to risk in face of external stimulus has been examined with respect to, for example, strategic 
change (Greve, 1998), decision making (Adner & Levinthal, 2004; Shimizu, 2007) or innovation 
(Bowman, 1980; Cyert & March, 1963).  
Consistent with behavioural research we define risk-taking and risk-averse behaviour in the 
following ways: Risk-taking behaviour takes firms into unknown or uncertain domains can be difficult 
or  costly to implement, and may involve the use of resources without a guarantee of positive returns. In 
contrast, risk-averse behaviour refers to actions that exhibit caution and an inward looking tendency for 
strategic action, as well as falling back on known and routinized patterns of actions (Cook, Shortell, 
Conrad & Morrisey, 1983; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Chattopadhyay, Glick & 
Huber, 2001). In line with this, we perceive business model adaptation as risk-taking behaviour, since it 
often involves changing routinized patterns of actions (value proposition, market segments, value chain 
and/or value capture mechanisms), often with an uncertain outcome.   
Threats are commonly defined as “negative situations in which loss is likely and over which one 
has little control”, while opportunities imply a “positive situation in which gain is likely and over which 
one has a fair amount of control” (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001, p. 939). Perceptions of threat and 
opportunities in the external environment could be critical drivers of business model adaptation.  
However, it is not clear whether the perceptions of threat or opportunities promote or inhibit business 
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model “inertia”. That is, are firms more likely to hold on to or adapt their initial business model in face 
of threats or opportunities?  
Two distinct lines of argumentation—the threat-rigidity hypothesis (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 
1981) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)—are often applied to predict firm behaviour in 
response to external stimuli (e.g., Mishra, 1996; Chattopadhay et al., 2001). Holding different 
assumptions regarding the propensity of managers to engage in risk-averse versus risk-taking behaviour, 
these two theories predict very different organizational responses to external threats and opportunities. 
As we currently lack a strong theoretical foundation for understanding business model adaptation, 
bringing in these two established theories on organizational and strategic adaptation allows us to test 
their applicability in the context of business model adaptation.   
Business model adaptation in response to external threats and opportunities  
When facing a threat in the external environment, threat-rigidity theory (Staw et al., 1981) 
emphasizes the constraining role of past behaviour (past experience and rules) which is believed to 
determine largely actions taken in the present. “Because of restriction in information, constriction in 
control, and conservation of resources,” the organization and its top management “exhibit rigidity, or 
inability to act and/or do something new in the face of economic adversity” (Shimizu, 2007, p.1496). 
Research drawing on threat-rigidity theory thus finds that firms confronted with external threats are 
more likely to respond with caution, exhibit an inward-looking tendency, and to fall back on known and 
routinized patterns of actions (Chattopadhay et al., 2001; Shimizu, 2007). Hence, expecting managers to 
respond to threats with risk-averse behaviour, proponents of the threat-rigidity hypothesis argue that 
managers seek to offset negative perceptions by responding in organizational areas over which they 
think they can exert greater organizational control, and by relying on existing routines and practices 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Staw et al., 1981). In contrast, opportunities are associated with higher 
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levels of control and are “more likely to make salient the potential gains rather than the risks involved” 
which can lead managers to “initiate actions that might otherwise be perceived as too risky” 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001, p. 939).  
Following the logic of threat-rigidity theory, we predict that a perceived threat in the 
environment makes managers more likely to uphold the status quo of their business model, while 
perceiving an opportunity is likely to motivate managers to adapt their business model to take advantage 
of the opportunity:  
H1a: Under threat-rigidity theory, firms are less likely to adapt their business model under 
conditions of perceived threat than under conditions of perceived opportunity.  
In contrast to the threat-rigidity theory, prospect theory relies on the assumptions of “reference 
dependency,” “loss aversion,” and “diminishing sensitivity” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The basic 
idea is that managers are more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude. As a result, 
managers are more inclined towards risk-aversion when facing gains and more toward risk-taking when 
facing losses (Jegers, 1991; Shimizu, 2007; Barberis, 2013). Drawing on prospect theory, scholars have 
shown that firms performing poorly are more likely to exhibit risk-taking rather than risk-averse 
behaviour (Bowman, 1982, 1984). This is due to the fact, that firms facing threats of likely loss “have 
little to lose” and are thus more risk-seeking (Bromiley, 2010). In contrast, firms facing favourable 
conditions are risk-averse as they “have more to lose than to gain”, and are more likely to uphold the 
status quo.  
As mentioned above, we assume that business model adaptation is risky behaviour, since 
changing an existing business model tends to be costly and uncertain with respect to its outcome. Hence, 
following the logic of prospect theory, firms facing unfavourable conditions are more likely to respond 
with business model adaptation. Firms facing favourable conditions are more risk-averse since they 
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“have more to lose than to gain”, and are thus more likely to uphold the status quo of their business 
model. In sum, prospect theory suggests the following hypothesis:   
H1b: Under prospect theory, firms are more likely to adapt their business model under 
conditions of perceived threat than under conditions of perceived opportunity.  
The role of strategic orientation in business model adaptation   
Previous research on organizational behaviour suggests that the way a firm responds to events in 
its external environment is, amongst others, influenced by its strategic orientation (cf. March, 1981; Lant 
& Mezias, 1992; Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). The strategic orientation of a firm reflects what set of 
actions it believes will lead to superior performance (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997) and over time can build 
up to a strategic and organizational momentum. Strategic momentum occurs when firms develop 
routines based on past successful actions, and are likely to continue to act according to those routines. 
For example, while Hewlett-Packard and IBM sold their products through stores, Dell revolutionized the 
industry by cutting out intermediaries and selling PCs directly to consumers (Christensen, Johnson & 
Rigby, 2002). With the hype of the internet in the early 2000s, this business model became particularly 
successful. However, over time Dell had trouble in keeping up with the increasing demands for end-to-
end services rather than merely selling hardware directly to the customer. The core competency that 
once contributed to success thus became a hindrance in identifying and acting upon changes in customer 
demand. Seemingly, a momentum very similar to the one that kept HP and IBM from responding to Dell 
later kept Dell from responding to new environmental changes.  
In line with Miles, Snow, Meyer and Coleman (1978) and Chattopadhyay et al. (2001), we 
differentiate a firm’s strategic orientation into market development versus domain defence (or 
prospectors versus defenders, see Miles et al., 1978). Firms that emphasize market development 
continually seek to find and exploit new market opportunities and are often the engines of change in an 
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industry. Towards this end, they accumulate routines and skills that support them in being adaptable to 
changes in the external environment (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). In contrast, firms that emphasize 
domain defence attempt to maintain their territory by engaging in competitive pricing and “developing a 
single core technology that is highly cost-efficient” (Miles et al., 1978, p.551). The major risk of such a 
strategy is the unwillingness or inability to adapt to major shifts in the market. Hence, we expect that a 
firm’s strategic orientation is likely to influence its propensity to adapt its business model in the face of 
external threats and opportunities. 
Research based on threat-rigidity theory claims that an external threat is likely to reinforce the 
strategic momentum of the firm: When facing of external threats, managers are even more likely to act 
in accordance with what their firm is habituated to do (Ocasio, 1995; Staw et al., 1981; Chattopadhyay 
et al., 2001). Thus, firms that emphasize a strategy of market development are more likely to have the 
routines and resources in place to adapt more quickly to a threat than firms that are used to assuming a 
more defensive posture. With regard to perceived opportunity, threat-rigidity theory predicts that 
managers are motivated to “initiate actions that might otherwise be perceived as too risky” 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001, p. 939). Hence, a perceived opportunity in the external environment would 
further stimulate firms with a market development orientation to exploit new market opportunities. In 
contrast, firms emphasizing domain defence might consider the possibility to exploit an opportunity. 
However, without necessary routines in place, they need to spend time and effort on coordinating the 
required resources, and hereby risk looking the support of senior managers before they can act on the 
opportunity (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). Consequently, since managers are 
more likely to act in accordance with what their organization is habituated to do, we expect firms that 
emphasize market development to be better equipped to adapt their business model to emerging threats 
or opportunities in the external environment.  
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H2a: The more a firm’s strategic orientation emphasizes market development over domain 
defence, the more it is likely to adapt its business model to external threats and opportunities.   
Hypothesis 2a is consistent with both prospect theory and threat-rigidity theory. Prospect theory suggests 
that firms facing an external threat are more likely to engage in risk-seeking actions. Thus, for firms 
emphasizing a market development orientation, the effect predicted under prospect theory is amplified. 
For firms emphasizing domain defence, a threat in the external environment may lead to considerations 
of risk taking actions. However, a “… lack of enabling routines will reduce the likelihood of such 
action” (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001, p. 942). Under conditions of perceived opportunity, prospect theory 
predicts that managers are more risk averse, as they have more to lose than to gain. Consequently, since 
managers are more likely to act in accordance with what their organization is habituated to do, we 
expect firms that emphasize domain defence to uphold the status quo in lieu of threats or opportunities. 
H2b: The more a firm’s strategic orientation emphasizes domain defence over market 
development, the more it is likely to uphold the status quo in lieu of threats or opportunities. 
Data and methods 
We use data from an extensive survey about the effects of the financial crisis and the subsequent 
recession on Norwegian firms. The survey was distributed to the CEOs of 5,000 Norwegian firms in 
November 2010. These firms were randomly chosen from the population of Norwegian firms with the 
following limitations: Firms had to have a minimum turnover of NOK 10 million ($ 1.7 million) in 
2007, and salary expenses of minimum NOK 3 million ($ 0.5 million). This was done to avoid the large 
number of small firms that are set up as tax shelters, and have no real operations. We also removed all 
government-owned firms, and thirteen two-digit NACE-industries, which we believe would have 
disturbed the generality of the sample. These included firms from the agriculture, health and culture 
sectors due to their close connections to, and funding from, the public sector. The reason we did not 
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include them is that they could potentially use public financing as a buffer against the financial crisis, 
and/or they exist to serve non-profit goals. We believe that it is questionable whether the adaptation 
pressures, strategic orientations and possible business model adaptations we discuss here would fully 
apply to such firms. We also excluded firms from the banking and insurance sector since these firms 
were subject to special government intervention during our sampling period, and also because our 
primary interest was in the responses of the non-financial sector to the financial crisis. The list of 
excluded industries is provided in Appendix 1. These restrictions left us with a total sample frame of 
17,312 firms from which 5,000 firms where randomly chosen to receive the survey. Appendix 2 
provides descriptive statistics of the sample frame, and Appendix 3 describes the industry composition. 
We received 1,248 responses, yielding a response rate of 25%, which is above average for surveys using 
CEOs as respondents. Missing data from the survey or inability to match survey data with publicly 
available accounting data reduced the effective sample to 1,196 firms. Test for non-response bias 
showed no significant bias with respect to firm size, firm age, debt level, pre-recession profitability or 
industry membership.  
Except for the control variables, all our variables are from the same survey, based on self-reports 
by the same informants, and collected at the same point in time. This means that common method 
variance (CMV) may potentially bias our data, and our coefficient estimates (Williams & Brown, 1994). 
We use Harman’s one-factor test to examine if our data seems materially influenced by CMV.1 The 
single factor model explained 26.6%, well below the conventional 50% threshold. If we do not constrain 
the model to a single factor, we obtain four distinct factors with eigenvalues > 1.0. These four factors 
accounted for a total of 56% of the variance in our data, but the largest factor did not explain a majority 
                                                 
1 There is a lively and as yet unsettled debate about how to detect CMV problems, and if they are found, how to correct for 
them (e.g. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003; Richardson, Simmering & Sturman, 2009; Williams, Hartman & 
Cavazotte, 2010); or even if CMV problems constitute an “urban legend” (Spector 2006, p. 230). We follow the mainstream in 
our choice of tests for CMV (Craighead, Ketchen, Dunn & Hult, 2011).  
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of this variance (26.6%). This does not mean that we conclusively rule out CMV, but these post hoc 
tests indicate that there are no “red flags”. However, we want to note that the most likely source of CMV 
in our data would be self-serving biases or social desirability bias. In particular, some of the CEO 
respondents may, for example, view a market development strategy more socially desirable than a 
domain defence strategy, and those that have this bias may also systematically prefer being perceived as 
someone who is dynamic and able to engineer change. The combination of these preferences could 
inflate the measured correlation between the market development orientation and extent of business 
model adaptation. Notably, there are problems with attempting to correct for CMV as well. As pointed 
out by Richardson, Simmering and Sturman (2009), all methods for correcting for CMV are risky, and if 
CMV-problems are small, the corrections may cause bigger problems than they solve. Given that CMV-
problems appear to be small in our data, we cautiously proceeded without making any corrections. 
Dependent variable: Business model adaptation  
The question how to measure business models and the change thereof has not been clearly answered in 
the business model literature.  That is, a validated measurement scale is still not available. Instead, as a 
recent study by Clauss (2016) shows, each business model dimension is commonly measured 
individually before an overall change in the business model can be detected. For this purpose, we 
aligned our measurement closely to what is arguably the dominant notion of a business model: (1) the 
value proposition, (2) choice of target customer, (3) structure of the value delivery and (4) value capture 
mechanisms. The value proposition defines a portfolio of solutions (products and or services) for 
customers (Morris et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2008). Thus, to measure a change in this dimension, we 
asked whether respondents had introduced new products/services or reduced number of 
products/services. Further, business models can be adapted by changing the target customer, for 
example offering the same service to an entirely new segment of customers (hereby, creating a new 
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market). Thus, to measure a change in target segment, we asked whether respondents had increased 
sales effort to new customers or increased sales effort to customers abroad. The structure of value 
delivery defines how and by what means firms create value along the value chain using suppliers and 
external collaboration partners (Achtenhagen et al., 2013). Thus, we asked respondents whether they had 
established closer links with partners, used new suppliers, or engaged in reorganization.  Value capture 
defines how value propositions are converted into revenues (Teece, 2010), hence we asked respondents 
whether they had reduced or increased prices because of the crisis.  
 To reveal to which extent firms adapted their business model, we asked respondents to indicate 
which initiatives had been taken in response to the crisis. In this way, we intended to reduce the risk of 
including changes that were done for other reasons than the financial crisis. Running a cluster analysis 
on these four variables revealed that firms could be classified into three groups based on the extent to 
which they adapted their business model as a response to the crisis. Tables 3a and 3b summarize the 
result of the cluster analysis. Firms that fall into Cluster 1 made no adaptations to their business models. 
Firms that fall into Cluster 2 adapted all four dimensions of their business model (“total adaptation”), 
while firms in Cluster 3 only adapted their target market and value delivery mechanisms (“semi 
adaptation”).  
Independent variables 
 Type of impact. To measure the type of external impact (threat versus opportunity) posed by the 
financial crisis, we asked respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale “to what extent the company 
was affected by the financial crisis and the recession that followed.” We define threat as the perception 
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of a negative effect, while opportunity refers to being positively affected. The variable exhibited the 
following frequencies:2  
 “Strongly and severely negatively affected” (6.6%)  
 “Significantly negatively affected” (23.4%) 
 “Moderately negatively affected” (49.3%) 
 “Not affected” (16.8%) 
 “Positively affected” (3.9%) 
 Strategic orientation. To capture a market development orientation, respondents were asked to 
indicate whether they had emphasized implementation of new solutions, launch of new products/services 
and innovation/R&D in the competition against their closest competitors before the financial crisis. This 
ensured capturing the strategic momentum built up in firms prior to the financial crisis, as we expect 
firms to fall back on habituated routines and processes when faced with threats in the external 
environment. To capture a domain defence orientation, respondents were asked to indicate whether they 
had emphasized reduction of operating costs, process improvement and low prices before the crisis 
(Sanz-Valle, Sabater-Sanchez & Aragon-Sanchez, 1999; Dess & Davis, 1984). 
Control variables  
Firms of different size and age may have different robustness in the face of a recession, and have different 
abilities to marshal support from external stakeholders, even if they are exposed to the same level of 
exogenous disturbance (Geroski & Gregg, 1997; Petersen & Strongin, 1996). To avoid the possibility that 
                                                 
2 We are aware that the threat stimulus is stronger than the opportunity stimulus. This raises the possible problem that our 
opportunity treatment is insufficiently strong to cause business model adaptation, while our threat treatment is. This warrants 
caution in interpreting our results. 
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size and age effects interfere with the relationships we wish to examine, we control for both size (measured 
as turnover from accounting data), and age (years since incorporation, also from accounting data).  
Analysis and Results 
Table 4 shows the results of bivariate correlations among the dependent and independent variables.  
-------- Insert Table 4 here-------- 
All hypotheses were tested by means of multinomial logistic regressions.3 Table 5 summarizes the 
results of the multinomial logistic regression. We furthermore examined the robustness of the coefficient 
estimates in Table 5 by bootstrapping, without finding any problematic biases.4 Table 6 provides the 
model summary (goodness of fit measures) for all models.   
-------- Insert Tables 5 and 6 here-------- 
Model 1 tests Hypotheses 1a and 1b, which concern how perceptions of threat and opportunity influence 
business model adaptation (controlling for size and age). Model 1 suggests that the more severe the 
external threat, the more likely is it that firms engage in business model adaptation. Companies that 
reported not being affected by the crisis are found to uphold their initial business model (i.e. not to 
engage in adaptation). However, there is no significant relationship between being “positively affected” 
(perception of opportunity) and the propensity to engage in business model adaptation. Thus, while we 
have to reject Hypothesis 1a (i.e., business model adaptation in response to perceived opportunity), there 
is support for Hypothesis 1b, that is, business model adaptation is more likely to happen when managers 
face a perceived threat in the external environment.  
                                                 
3 We chose multinomial logistic regression, because the dependent variable is categorical with more than two possible discrete 
outcomes (i.e., categorical variables). Conducting, for example, a multinomial probit regression would not be feasible, as the 
probit technique assumes that the probability of the dependent variable can be described by the normal distribution. This is not 
the case for our dependent variable. As we cannot satisfy the normality assumption, we chose the logit distribution.  
4 We performed bootstrapping analyses both with and without stratified sampling. Our stratified sampling included size, age 
and degree of recession impact. 
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Model 2 tests Hypotheses 2a and 2b on the effect of strategic orientation on the propensity to 
engage in business model adaptation. The results show that firms with a market development orientation 
are more likely to engage in business model adaptation (findings significant at p < 0.01). In contrast, 
firms with a domain defence orientation are significantly less likely to engage in business model 
adaptation (findings significant at p < 0.05). Hence, both Hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported. 
Furthermore, Model 2 provides more detailed insight into the effects of threats and opportunities on 
business model adaptation. While Model 1 only showed that perceptions of threat lead to “total business 
model adaptation”, Model 2 further shows that perceptions of opportunity are significantly related to 
upholding the status quo of the business model. This further strengthens support for Hypothesis 1b 
predicted by Prospect theory.  We summarize our findings in table 7.  
-------- Insert Table 7 here-------- 
Discussion and conclusions 
Contribution to knowledge 
The business model literature has made begun to address the drivers, processes and facilitators of 
changes in business models (e.g., Achtenhagen et al., 2013; Andries et al., 2013; Bohnsack et al., 2013; 
McNamara et al., 2013; Mason & Leek, 2008; Andries & Debackere, 2006, 2007; Willemstein et al., 
2007). Linking up with such recent efforts, we have highlighted the need for more systematic knowledge 
about the drivers of business model adaptation, that is, how firms change their business models in 
response to external changes. In particular, we offered empirical evidence on the conditions (perceived 
threat versus opportunity, and strategic orientation) under which firms are more likely to adapt their 
business models. While some studies predicted that business model adaptation is likely to happen under 
conditions of external threat (e.g. Voelpel et al., 2004; De Reuever et al., 2009), others pointed towards 
the importance of perceived opportunities as a catalyst for business model adaptation (e.g., Pateli & 
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Giaglis, 2005; Sabatier et al., 2012). Our study is, to our knowledge, the first large-scale empirical 
inquiry into the drivers (opportunity versus threat) of business model adaptation.   
Our results show that firms’ propensity to adapt their business models depends on whether an 
event in the environment is perceived as a threat or as an opportunity, and what type of strategic 
orientation the firm pursues. In particular, we found that the more severe the external threat, the more 
likely that firms engage in business model adaptation. In contrast, perceptions of opportunity were found 
to be significantly associated with upholding the status quo of the business model. These findings are 
consistent with prospect theory, which suggests that in the face of external threats, managers are more 
inclined towards risky behaviour, such as adapting the firm’s business model. In contrast, we could not 
find support for the threat-rigidity hypothesis, which predicted that a threat in the environment leads to 
upholding the status quo. There may be various reasons for this finding. Prospect theory and threat-
rigidity theory build upon different assumptions regarding the propensity of managers to engage in risk-
averse versus risk-seeking behaviour. Hence, they predict different organizational responses to external 
threats. Thus, one explanation for rejecting the threat-rigidity hypothesis might be the cultural 
idiosyncrasy of our Norwegian sample. For example, studies on cultural determinants of organizational 
behaviour have observed national differences in risk-taking behaviour between managers from different 
countries (e.g., Hsee & Weber, 1997, 1999; Weber & Hsee, 1998; Weber, Hsee & Sokolowska, 1998). 
Thus, managers in our sample might have been more prone to alter their existing business models when 
perceiving an external threat. Cross-cultural studies are required to shed more light on the role of culture 
in business model adaptation. Another potential explanation is that we do not have sufficiently high 
scores on perceived opportunities in our data, while we do have high scores on perceived threats. An 
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implication may be that prospect theory is correct on the threat side, while threat-rigidity theory may be 
correct on the opportunity side. However, our empirical analysis cannot show this.5  
 Furthermore, in line with both prospect theory and threat-rigidity theory, we expected that the 
strategic orientation of a firm (past experience and path dependencies) might determine the propensity of 
firms’ to adapt their business model. Our results indicate that firms that pursue a market development 
orientation are also more likely to engage in business model adaptation. By definition, firms pursuing a 
market development orientation develop routines and processes that allow them to respond effectively to 
external stimuli. Such inherent innovativeness and flexibility allow these firms to be better equipped to 
adapt their business model to emerging threats and opportunities in the external environment.   
In contrast, we found that firms pursuing a domain defence orientation, such as seeking to offer 
low prices and minimize operating costs, are significantly less likely to engage in business model 
adaptation. Perhaps one reason for this finding might be that such firms are often the least adversely 
affected in a recession, since low cost and low prices are usually more in tune with market changes 
during a recession. Since the market is “turning their way”, one may assume that these firms are 
generally less likely to adapt their business models in response to a recession.   
In fact, while in Model 1, a perception of an opportunity was not significantly related to business 
model adaptation, Model 2 shows that firms reporting “not being affected” or “positively affected” by 
the recession were significantly less likely to adapt their business models. This is, again, in line with 
prospect theory, predicting that firms facing favourable conditions are more risk-averse as they have 
more to lose than to gain.  
                                                 
5 Moreover, as Kitching et al. (2009, p.12) point out, “there is no single ‘recession effect’ for businesses, nor consequently 
any particular ‘best way’ to adapt applicable to all businesses.” 
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 Overall, our findings indicate that an external threat in the business environment is a strong 
predictor of business model adaptation. Furthermore, a firm’s strategic orientation significantly affects 
its ability to pursue business model adaptation consistent with environmental imperatives. Our 
theorizing and analysis of the effects of external threats, opportunities and strategic orientation on the 
incidence of business model adaptation represents an important step towards an improved understanding 
of business model dynamics. As such, it links up with the emerging literature on the dynamics of 
business models (e.g., Achtenhagen et al., 2013; Andries et al., 2013; Bohnsack et al., 2013; McNamara 
et al., 2013; Mason & Leek, 2008; Andries & Debackere, 2006, 2007; Willemstein et al., 2007). For 
managers, our findings imply the important role of strategic orientation on the firm’s ability to adapt its 
business model in face of threats and opportunities. While an orientation towards market development is 
found to facilitate business model adaptation, a domain defence orientation appears to be a hindrance 
when it comes to business model adaptation.   
Future research 
The results of this research should obviously be judged in the light of its limitations—which 
future research may address. First, our reasoning relies on key unobserved mechanisms, namely the 
behaviours of top managers and the mental processes that drive these behaviours. In other words, we 
have not observed the mechanisms based on prospect theory and threat-rigidity theory that we have 
postulated. In the absence of multi-level data for the same population that would allow us to address this 
mechanism, we cannot rule out that other mechanisms may underlie our findings. This is where more 
qualitative, observational and interview-based data may be useful to lend credence to the mechanism we 
have posited. Furthermore, our data are based on single respondents in each firm, collected at one point 
in time, using one common method of data collection. Each of these features of our research can be the 
source of potential biases that future research should seek to overcome. 
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The setting of our research (the recession in the wake of the financial crisis) is both a source of 
strength and a potential weakness. It can be considered a strength because it is an event that affects a 
large number of firms roughly at the same time, and in the same manner. Still there is also variation in 
the “treatment effect” in the sense that the severity of the impact differs. This makes it possible to obtain 
a sample large enough to study quantitatively how firms respond, and analyse differences in responses 
across firms. The weakness is that our findings could be specific to the financial crisis, and to Norway. 
The impact of the financial crisis on Norwegian firms came mostly in the form of reduced demand, and 
substantially less in the form of credit constraints. The former affected 68% of all businesses, and the 
latter 23%. We therefore believe that our findings generalize to negative demand shocks more generally, 
but this is admittedly a conjecture, not something we have proven. As we move towards threats of a very 
different nature, such as, say, regulatory shocks, terror, or natural disasters, we become increasingly less 
certain that our results generalize. Therefore, replication of our findings in the context of different types 
of threats (and opportunities) seems important and worthwhile. Still, we feel that the methodological 
advantages of being able to study a large “natural experiment” outweigh the disadvantages at this stage.      
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